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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 002846

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [KNNP](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [MNUC](#) [IR](#) [NL](#) [IAEA](#)

SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: DUTCH MFA NONPRO CHIEF ON ELBARADEI
REPORT

REF: A. STATE 315022

[B](#). STATE 313454

[C](#). STATE 302819

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MARY DALY FOR REASONS
1.5 (B AND D)

[1](#)1. (C) Poloffs delivered ref A nonpaper to MFA Nonproliferation Chief Paul Wilke on November 13. Wilke (protect throughout) said the GONL shared the U.S. conclusion that the latest ElBaradei report confirms Iran has been pursuing capabilities needed for a nuclear weapons program. In the Dutch view, the report provides "every reason to conclude that there has been non-compliance." As to next steps, the GONL places a premium on maintaining a common EU position on the issue but also wants to uphold transatlantic unity. Wilke said the EU3 was keeping its discussions on the issue from other members. That said, he thought it possible FM Fischer might have briefed FM de Hoop Scheffer on the issue; if so details had not reached his (DAS) level. He also noted there has been no leaking either in Teheran or in EU3 capitals, and the EU3 embassies in Teheran did not seem to be well-informed on the issue. Wilke shares U.S. concerns about Iran trying to split the U.S. from the EU on this issue (ref B). In terms of pursuing a noncompliance resolution at the November 20 Board of Governors (BOG) meeting, the key for the GONL was the British. It was not likely the GONL could go along if the UK were not onboard.

[1](#)2. (C) Wilke raised the issue of the desired end-state, i.e., if the goal is elimination of the Iranian weapons program, now that the Iranians are providing some measure of cooperation it will be difficult to agree on which elements of the fuel cycle are peaceful and which support a weapons program. Concerning a technical finding of noncompliance, such as the Romanian example detailed ref C, Wilke thought it might be possible but said it could be disadvantageous for follow-on actions because it would take the initiative away from the BOG. Wilke said that given that an additional report was possible owing to the need to confirm details such as the source of HEU and LEU contamination the results of this might provide even more diplomatic leverage for a noncompliance finding.
RUSSEL